Abstract-In Social Networks, such as facebook, Iinkedin, twitter, google+ and others, many members post messages to walls or to timelines of their friends, or to that of pages or of groups, There is permanent competition over visibility of content in these destination since timelines have finite capacity. As new content arrives, older content gets pushed away from the timeline.
I. INTRODUCTION
Timelines in social networks are limitted due to capacity limits of the time line. It is also Iimitted by visibility limitation due to a finite screen size and to scrolling habits of Intemauts. Sources of content that wish to be visible on a given timeline have to take into account other flows of content that compete over space in the same timeline. Members of a social network may thus be pushed to resend their own content or other's content in order to make their opinions visible. In absence of such actions. the average number of their po sots at the destination may be very small. The choice of rates of content can be formulated as a non cooperative game where a source's utility is the difference between some desimination payoff and some cost for sendingn more content.
In a previous paper, Altman et al [12] have studied this game under the assumptions:
• of a smooth arrival process of contents modeled as having a Poisson distributed,
• the dissemination utility of a source was assumed to be the indicator of having at least one content of that source in the destination timeline,
• that one is interested in the stationary behavior.
In this paper we shall abandon the restrictive Poisson as sumption. We allow for general dependence of times between creation of content by a given source and also across different sources. We shall only require that the times of content creation at each different source i is stationary ergodic point process, and that their superposition is a simple process (at a given time there may only be a single content arrival.
978-1-4799-3635-9/14/$31.00 ©2014 IEEE The assumptlOIn on stationary behavior is well suited to a subscriber's wall. Indeed, there is no reason to expect the subscriber to access his wall at times with a distribution which is not time uniform. In this paper, we consider in contrast theh behavior of group subscribers. In facebook, these subscribers receive notifications whenever a new content arrives. We thus assume here that a subscriber does not observe the system at a stationary regime but rather at instants of arrivals of new contents. In the theory of point process, the system as observed at arrival instants of points in a stationary ergodic point process corresponds to the so called Palm probability.
Another difference with respect to [12] is that we shall consider in this paper the total number of contents at arrival times of contents as the dissemination payoff function.
Our first result of this paper is to show that the problem can be reduced to the well known generalized Kelly mechanism, which allows us to use many existing results to characterize the equilibrium. We moreover derive the equilibrium in explicit form and thus ontain new results for the generalized Kelly mechanism.
We then extend the model to study rerouting of posts, which corresponds to sharing content.
II. REL ATED WORK
We briefly discuss the generaliszed Kelly mechanism. Con sider a resource K that is to be shared among .J strategic users.
A user males propose a bid Aj Then the resource is shared proportionally to the bids, so that the amount of resource that player .J receives is and each player j has a proportionaly cost Ij for his bid. Finally his objectif function is:
where Uj (.) is a function that measure the satisfaction that receive the player j when he has K Z�\" of the res source.
A study of this game was proposed in [6] .We can find some networking applications of this game in [2] and [3] . A similar analytical work like ours, has been recently proposed in [12] . In this paper, the authors propose to study the competition over a news feed between several information providers (sources). There are several dilference with our study. First, they consider Poisson arrival rates whereas, in our model, we consider a more general point process. Second, they define the visibility over a news feed as the proportion of time one message is visible on the time line. Then, they consider in fact the case that only one message of each source can appear on the news feed. In our analysis we also generalize this point by considering that several messages, from the same source, can be visible on the news feed. Finally, we consider the propagation effect between news feed, which is not take into account in [12] .
III. THE GAME FORMULATION
Consider a single group of size K. It can thus contain upto K posts. Consider an arrival of content to that group which is a superposition of J stationary ergodic point processes Ni (i = 1, ... , N) assumed to be compatible with the flow B t , each of which has a finite and non null intensity A i. We call by N their superposition.
We use the definition of [13] for the Palm probability which is the probability as seen at an arrival instant. Let PJHA)
be the Palm probability corresponding to the point process N, and define similarly the Palm process that corresponds to point process Ni. Assume that Al (defined in the Introduction)
holds. Then it is shown in page 37 or [13] that (1) This formula states that when an arrival occurs, the probability that it is from source i is Ad A.
We consisder the dissemination utility for player i to be the sum of messages originating from it in the group at an arbitrary arrival instant of a content. This event can be written as
whose expectation with respect to the Palm probability mea sure is given by
due to (l.3.17) p 25 in [13] and eq (1).
We assume also that each source j has a cost for sending messages, which depends on his rate Aj. This cost is expressed by Ij Aj. Finally, source's j objective function is defined by the difference between the average number of messages and the cost for his spamming activity:
where A_j = {>.. l, ... ,Aj -l,Aj+l, ... ,AJ} is the strategy vector of all the other sources.
IV. COMPETITION BETWEEN SOURCES
We study the visibility competition between the sources.
We are faced to a normal form non-cooperative game with J sources. The utility function of each source depends on his rate and also on the rates of the other sources. The utility function for source j is given by equation (2).
Definition 1. The decision vector A * = (XL ... , Xl) is a nash equilibrium !f fo r all j E {I, ... , J},
where Amax is the maximum source rate.
In other words, no user has an interest to change his decision unilaterally at the Nash equilibrium.
This game has been already originally proposed in [6] but not in the context of social networks. It has been also used to study competition over popularity in [1] , but without considering a finite number of messages of interest in a group. Our game has several important properties. First, at equilibrium, at least one source send messages to the group. we give this property in the following proposition. D Second, we adapt in the following theorem the results obtained in [I] to our model. In this theorem, we obtain an explicit solution of the unique equilibrium of the game, when all the source send messages on the group. Theorem 3. If '£i /i -max j {tj }( J -1) > 0, we have that the Nash Equilibrium is uniquely defined by:
give us the best reply of the player j.
a;:i (Aj , A_ j
and we taking the sum over j, finally we have:
Because of proposition 2 we know that '£ i is why
and because of ( * ) we have the result. The unicity come from that A j
In the previous theorem, their is a condition over the cost /i for all i such that Ai > 0 for all i. If this condition is not satisfied, some rates can be equal to 0 at equilibrium for some sources. his result is described in the next theorem. Given the explicit expression of the Nash equilibrium of the game, we are able to give some nice properties of the equilibrium depending on the parameters of the game like the costs /j and the size of the group K . We denote that For all source j, the rate A j A j
With the precedent remark we can compute now a general form of the equilibrium and not just restrict our self to an equilibrium where '£i /i -max ;{ /j }( J -1) > 0, i.e when all A j from smallest /j to largest one, then / 1 > / 2 > ... > / J Theorem 4. Assume that j' is such that j' = max{j I tl� l j ) � ( 1 -t l � l ) �: ) s O} i.e j' is the source with largest /j who doesn't send any messages in the group. In this case the Nash Equilibrium is uniquely defined by:
where J' = J -I {I, ... ,j'} I Proof The only thing we have to proove is that if j' plays 0 at equilibirium, all the other sources j < j' play also O. This fact is obvious because A j
D
In order to study the inefficiency of the Nash Equilibrium we study now the price of anarchy [14] . First we define the social welfare of the game:
We maximize the social welfare:
(A� , ... , A�) = argmaxV(A 1 , ... , AJ) 
where j' is the source such that /j ' = maxi { ,d. Proof We have to compute Ui (AT , A-i *). The source with the lower objectif function at equilibrium is the one with the higher /j . We call this source j'
And we can easly deduce the form of the price of anarchy which is:
We consider a generalization of our model to take into account the propagation elfect between several groups, In fact, some messages posted on one group can be relayed (propagated) to another group, A message which is of interest for one community can be of interest for another community for which the center of interest is close.
We are interested in the particular question for the sources:"Knowing the propagation etlect between groups (the probability that a message has to be copied and to appear in another group), how each source will decide to send his information flow to the groups, directly or indirectly using the propagation etlect ?" Indeed, we have assumed that posting a message on a group has a cost for the source, whereas if a message is relayed, it is free for the source. Thus, in this section, we study this topological etlect on the non-cooperative game between the sources. In order to get interesting closed form results, we reduce the complexity of the game analysis by considering two groups, L = 2, but our results will be extended to more complex topologies in future works.
First, in the next sub-section, we define the point process model the characterizes the arrival of the messages for the different groups.
A. point process model
Now assume that you have 2 groups i E {I, 2}. Each source j E {I, ... , J} can send messages to each group 1 and 2. It means that each source j controls 2 point processes, which represent flow of messages of source j in each group, with intensity A ;
any new message will be copied and posted, with a probability Pll', to the other group if f i. This process defines a new point process in each group i with intensity P i' l L j Ar If we add all the point processes for a group i (direct and indirect messages), this new point process N l has an intensity L i (A ; We assume that K l is the number of messages that subscribers of group i take care on it. We denote by T� the arrival time of the n t h message in the group i. Let NJ((1;.,,1;"+Kl]) the number of messages from source j in group i, as long as the n t h message is visible on the group, i.e. is part of the first K l messages. Source j wants to maximize Nj that is the expected number of messages from him that are visible on all the groups:
By applying the similar analysis as in section for IV, we obtain the following closed-form expression:
Let ,; be the cost from source j for sending one message to group i. We denote the control vector of source j by A j {A] , An· The objective function of each source j is: 
with (r 1 r 2 ) = ( Alj -' j P2I
. Ij -Alj P12 ) for all J ' . We denote by
(A ] *, A ; *) the flow send by source j at equilibrium. We define a set A:
In the first proposition we give an other form of (3) in order to compute the equilibrium. Proof We are going to proove this theorem in two steps.
Step 1: let us look at the limit of the average number of messages in the two groups for player j (i.e the first part of the objectif function of the player j). Easily we can notice that
with j = A j + P21Aj and j = A j + P12Aj for a J.
Step 2: We want to find rj and r ; such that rj A ] + r ; A ; =
Secondly with the result above we can compute rj and r ; .
In fact,
Thus we can conclude that
Proof The proof follows two steps. Firstly we compute the equilibrium of (4) and secondly we make the change of variables in order to have the value of the direct flow of each sources at equilibrium.
Step 1: In order to find the equilibrium of (4) we have to compute the best reply. We do it just for one A}. It works the same way as A} for all the other j and group 2.
��i (Aj , A _j)
We remark that the best reply just depend of {ADj and it is equivalent to the best reply of the game (2) where the objectif function for each player j is:
This is why by using theorem 3 we have that J J Aj* P I 2 -A c* < 0 which implies that A]* = O. And if A]* < A}* then Aj* P21 -A}* < 0 which implies that A }* = O. This is why a player send messages just on one wall.
D
The previous theorem shows that under condition (HI) and (H2) all the sources send messages. And a another important result is that each source just sends messages on one group. In the next section we study the effect of the parameter on the equilibrium.
VI. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
We make our numerical illustrations with 'I = ,; = , for all j. We start fig. 2 . at P12 = 0.75 because with our parameters, when P12 < 0.75 the condition (HI) is not verify.
We can observe that A }* increasing in P12 and P21.
In fig. 3 . we can observe that sources (because symmetric sources have a symmetric behavior) prefer to send messages in group 2 when P12 < 0.4 and P21 = 0.45 or when P12 < 0.7 and P21 = 0.7. And they prefere to send to group 1 in the other case. You can see that when P I2 increase you have a preference for sending message in group 1 and when P21 increase you have a preference for sending message in group 2.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we model a competition between information sources that used a social network group in order to dissem inate and to maximize his visibility, particularly the visibility of his messages inside a group. We take into consideration that the messages on a group (in fact a newsfeed of a group) are of interest of the subscribers only if the massages are in the first K positions (more K recent). We have modelled the competition between sources using a noncooperative game and we have proved that this non-cooperative game is a standard game well knwon in telecommunication which has been stud ied in different contexts (resource sharing, communication, etc). We have also considered an interesting feature taking into account several groups and the possibility for a message to be copied and relayed from one group to another one. Then we have generalized our result and prove the existence of the equilibrium. In future works we plan to analyze more complex networks of groups in which messages can be propagated between several groups depending on the behavior of the group subscribers.
